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Abstract: This chapter considers the assumptions required to make scientisms of different forms 
genuinely threatening to philosophers, where a genuine threat would consist of a concrete risk to 
their statuses, the value of their teaching and research, their livelihoods, their preferred research 
methods, or the health of the discipline. I will find that strong and weak forms of scientism alike 
require substantive assumptions to make them threatening in those regards. In particular, they 
require sometimes heavy-handed circumscriptions of philosophy and science, as well as their 
epistemic credentials and achievements, methods, and subject matters. They also require 
restrictive pronouncements upon the epistemic and non-epistemic goods that are valuable, worth 
promoting in academic contexts, and relevant to disciplinary health. My aim in this chapter will 
not to be defeat those assumptions but rather to make them explicit and to emphasize their 
frequent strength and contentiousness. 
1. Images of Scientism 
 There is a kind of arrogantly dismissive attitude toward non-scientific fields of inquiry 
and ways of knowing — often associated with publicly prominent physicists and so-called new 
atheists — which sometimes gets called ‘scientism’ (the kind described by e.g. Pigliucci 2018). 
There is also a kind of admiringly respectful attitude toward science, paired with an optimism 
regarding its import for traditionally non-scientific questions — often associated with avowedly 
naturalistic philosophers — which sometimes gets called ‘scientism’ (the kind espoused by e.g. 
Ladyman et al. 2007). Some philosophers pick fights about what the term really means or what 
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really falls under its rubric. Yet there is no use warring over the label and its essential 
connotations, since terms of art such as this can mean what we want them to.  1
 However, the history of a term can make us less terminologically flexible than we might 
be ideally. Defenders of scientism face an uphill battle to convince others of the palatability of at 
least some scientisms. Part of the difficulty stems from the history of the label, in which the term 
was inherently pejorative (Dupré 1993, Haack 2003, Sorell 1991). Notwithstanding the term’s 
well-known reappropriation by naturalists such as Rosenberg (2011) and Ladyman et al. (2007), 
defenders of scientism are apparently still working to unsaddle the term of its baggage.  
 For instance, Ladyman (2018) proposes to give scientism a humane face, which suggests 
that its usual face is generally thought to be inhumane. Buckwater and Turri (2018) defend a 
moderate form of scientism, which suggests that the usual form is generally thought to be 
immoderate. Mizrahi (2017) asks what’s so bad about scientism and defends what he calls weak 
scientism, which suggests that scientism is generally thought to be both bad and unduly strong. 
These authors think that scientism need not be inherently vicious or threatening, but rather that 
philosophy can benefit from adopting some appropriately temperate form of it. If these defences 
of ‘nice’ scientism are any indication, defenders of scientism are working to overcome a rather 
mean-looking image.  
 So there is a clear sociological narrative according to which scientism is generally 
regarded by philosophers as (echoing Haack 2017, 41) a spectre, to be regarded with fear or 
hostility. Mizrahi (2019) even sets out to empirically test possible explanations as to why many 
philosophers find scientism threatening. But even if some philosophers are threatened by it — as 
evidenced by the occasional “ferociousness” with which they respond to it (Mizrahi 2019, 1) — 
there is still a question as to the prevalence of the sense of threat. In a well-known study, Bourget 
and Chalmers showed that “philosophers have substantially inaccurate sociological beliefs about 
the views of their peers” (2014, 489). This shows the importance of substantiating our 
 By this, I mean that we can stipulate meanings for terms of art. There are of course reasons why 1
certain choices might be impractical or strange. For instance, it would be impractical to define 
‘scientism’ in a way that had nothing to do with how anyone else uses it. Moreover, it would be 
strange to define it in a way that had nothing to do with science. But even if it would be 
impractical or strange for us to do these things, we still could. 
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sociological narratives. We ought to empirically confirm that the running sociological narrative 
represents philosophical sentiment.  
 However, without introducing some operative definition of scientism, the question of how 
philosophers really feel about scientism is too ambiguous to constitute a well-defined research 
question. As we have seen, in the broadest strokes, there are at least two competing images of 
scientism: the mean one and the comparatively nice one. To complicate matters further, attempts 
to generate a specific and contentful formulation of scientism have produced vastly many 
substantively distinct theses, both of the inherently negative variety (Haack 2003, 2012, 2017; 
Pigliucci 2010; Sorell 1991) and of non-negative varieties (Buckwalter and Turri 2018, Ladyman 
et al. 2007, Mizrahi 2017, and Rosenberg 2011). This has, in turn, resulted in the need to catalog, 
compare, and taxonomize the various formulations (Hietanen et al. 2020, Peels 2018, Stenmark 
2018). So at this complicated juncture in the dialectic, it is clear that there is no one thing, 
scientism, about which we can gauge overall philosophical sentiment. Rather, there are a range of 
scientisms, our attitudes toward which require much more directed and detailed sociological 
investigation. So what we need in order to test our sociological narrative is unambiguous 
hypotheses; then, since such hypotheses would concern conscious individual feelings, the natural 
way to proceed (as de Ridder 2019 [and possibly this volume] and Wilson 2019 [and possibly 
this volume] point out) would be via survey and interview. 
 Setting aside the sociological question of how philosophers actually feel about various 
scientisms, I propose to consider whether they should feel threatened by any forms of scientism, 
and if so, which ones and why. For the purposes of this chapter, for philosophers to ‘feel 
threatened’ by a form of scientism is for them to believe that its truth — or perceived truth — 
would harm, disrupt, or undermine their professional standing or certain other things they value. 
Inter alia, philosophers feeling threatened by scientism could involve their believing it poses 
some concrete risk to: 
• their prestige or status 
• the value of their teaching and research 
• their livelihood 
• the fruitfulness or continuation of their preferred research methods 
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• the health of the discipline 
Given this characterization of what it means for philosophers to ‘feel threatened’ by a form of 
scientism, it follows that for it to be the case they should feel so threatened would be for them to 
be correct in their belief that the truth or perceived truth of the relevant form of scientism could 
potentially harm, disrupt, or undermine the sorts of things I have listed. What I am interested in 
is what sorts of epistemological, methodological, and value-theoretic assumptions would warrant 
such a belief. So, ultimately, my question is: which, if any, forms of scientism are threatening, on 
which assumptions? 
 Section 2 will distinguish a number of scientisms. Section 3 will spell out the sorts of 
assumptions required to make strong scientisms — which are the most prima facie threatening 
scientisms — plausibly true and plausibly threatening to philosophers in the ways I have spelled 
out. Section 4 will do the same for Mizrahi’s ‘weak scientism’, and Section 5 will conclude.  
2. Scientisms 
 To answer the question of which forms of scientism are threatening under which 
assumptions, I must first distinguish a variety of scientisms. Space limitations allow me to 
consider just a smattering of available positions, but I hope it to be adequately representative. For 
a fuller taxonomy of scientisms and their logical relations to one another, see Peels (2018). 
 First, consider the inherently negative variety, which builds in elements such as 
unwarranted, exaggerated, excessive, or uncritical attitudes. For instance, take Susan Haack’s 
characterization of scientism as “inappropriate, uncritical deference to the sciences” (2017, 41). 
The question of whether this sort of scientism could potentially harm, disrupt, or undermine 
philosophy is not particularly interesting. In fact, the answer is virtually trivial. That’s because it 
doesn’t take a particularly strong or controversial view of what’s healthy or unhealthy for the 
discipline to think that any unwarranted, exaggerated, excessive, or uncritical philosophical 
attitudes would, if sufficiently prevalent, be bad for it. Unwarranted, exaggerated, and excessive 
attitudes are inherently inappropriate, so their prevalence in philosophy would be intrinsically 
bad. At any rate, insofar as I see questions regarding the advisability, worth, and epistemic 
4
virtuousness or viciousness (Kidd 2018) of scientism as both live and interesting, I believe we 
should prefer neutral definitions. ,  With that said, I set the inherently negative definitions aside.  2 3
 As far as neutral definitions go, the category is remarkably heterogenous. Consider the 
following theses, in which slashes indicate alternate formulations, and which vary in substance 
(epistemological, methodological, and disciplinary) and strength (strong, moderate, and weak): 
Strong Epistemological Scientism: Science is the only/only good source of certain 
epistemic goods (knowledge, justified belief, evidence…). 
Moderate Epistemological Scientism: Science is the best source of certain 
epistemic goods. 
Weak Epistemological Scientism: Science is a comparatively excellent source of 
certain epistemic goods.  
Strong Methodological Scientism: Given their epistemic aims, inquirers/
philosophers should only use the methods of science. 
Moderate Methodological Scientism: Given their epistemic aims, inquirers/
philosophers should primarily use the methods of science. 
 
Weak Methodological Scientism: Given their epistemic aims, inquirers/
philosophers should to some extent use the methods of science.  
Strong Disciplinary Scientism: Science will/should subsume/replace all other 
forms of inquiry. 
 Though I acknowledge that this ponens could well be tollens-ed.2
 Similarly, Mizrahi argues that our definition shouldn’t be persuasive in the sense of being 3
inherently disapproving (2017, 352). 
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Moderate Disciplinary Scientism: Science will/should subsume/replace most other 
forms of inquiry. 
Weak Disciplinary Scientism: Science will/should subsume/replace some other 
forms of inquiry.  
The list is neither exhaustive nor authoritative. Other variations are certainly possible. For 
instance, methodological naturalism might be formulated non-prescriptively, as a value-theoretic 
claim stating that scientific methods are superior to all others.  Of course, such a claim might be 4
thought to lead naturally to the prescriptive claim that inquirers should use those methods. 
 What I have called ‘disciplinary’ scientism can be interpreted as a form of ‘scientific 
imperialism’, according to which the boundaries of the discipline or institution of science will or 
should extend outward to enfold erstwhile independent disciplines such as philosophy. Such 
scientisms claim neither that science has any special role in securing epistemic goods 
(epistemological scientism), nor that philosophy should use scientific methods (methodological 
scientism), but rather that philosophy will or should become part of science or be eliminated in 
its favour, depending on the formulation. The precise content of the thesis needs to be specified. 
For instance, one possible disciplinary thesis could prescribe that faculties of arts be disbanded 
and that departments such as philosophy be enfolded under faculties of science. An alternate 
thesis could prescribe that philosophers be fired and their jobs given to scientists. There is a lot 
of room for variation.  
 Epistemological, methodological, and disciplinary varieties of scientism should not be 
conflated. Epistemological varieties concern the capacity of science to secure epistemic goods; 
methodological varieties concern the integration of scientific methods into philosophy or other 
areas of inquiry; disciplinary varieties concern disciplinary boundaries. These different sorts of 
 In characterizing methodological scientism prescriptively, I have followed Peels, according to 4
whom “on methodological scientism, all or some academic disciplines different from the natural 
sciences should adopt the methods of the natural sciences in order to solve the problems of those 
fields” (2018, 49).
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thesis might interrelate in interesting ways. For instance, the idea that science has a monopoly on 
knowledge (strong epistemological scientism) could motivate the claim that science should 
replace all other forms of inquiry (strong disciplinary scientism). Notwithstanding such possible 
connections, the distinctions among these scientisms should be kept clearly in mind.  
 Whether all of the above theses count as bonafide forms of scientism is an open question. 
However, as I indicated at the outset, I take it to be a merely terminological one, to which there is 
no definitive or interesting answer. Whether all candidate formulations of scientism could be 
unified under a single overarching thesis is another open question. However, I believe the 
prospects for unification to be slim, given the heterogeneity of available conceptions. 
 There are still further distinctions to be drawn, in addition to the ones already highlighted. 
For instance, while Rosenberg claims that “Thoroughgoing scientism leaves no room for 
normative values” (2020, 50 [and possibly also this volume]), some scientisms are themselves 
thoroughly normative, since some make methodological prescriptions, and since some (I would 
argue most) are premised on the epistemic or pragmatic value of science. Other formulations of 
scientism are modal, such as those that claim that only science can address certain kinds of 
questions. Others still are descriptive, such as disciplinary theses claiming that science will 
subsume or replace other forms of inquiry. Moreover, we can distinguish scientisms not only in 
terms of strength, but also in terms of scale. For instance: a global form of epistemological 
scientism might say that science is the best source of evidence regarding any question 
whatsoever. A comparatively local form might say that science is the best source of evidence 
regarding certain sorts of questions (such as metaphysical or moral questions). So scientisms 
have many distinguishing features and differ in a variety of interesting and important ways.  
 These sorts of distinctions ought always to inform our discussions of scientism. Some 
philosophical terms are so thoroughly contested and variably defined that we cannot hope to 
have a productive conversation about them without disambiguating clearly at the outset. 
Scientism is one of those terms. Failing to disambiguate leads to ignored distinctions, 
misconstruals and cross-purposes, as well as obscured lines between scientism and a 
constellation of nearby epistemological and methodological positions and practices, such as 
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empiricism, physicalism, realism, naturalism, and interdisciplinarity.  So I hereby plead: if we’re 5
going to talk about ‘scientism’, let’s always start with a definition.   6
3. Making Spectres of Scientisms 
 The question at hand is: which assumptions warrant a sense of threat among philosophers 
in response to which forms of scientism? In this section, I will identify a number of assumptions 
required to make scientisms plausibly true and plausibly threatening to philosophers’ statuses, 
livelihoods, preferred research methods, and so forth. While the assumptions are compatible with 
scientism, they are not entailed by it and therefore not necessarily held by its proponents. Rather, 
all of the assumptions must be appended to scientism and held by individual philosophers who 
find scientism threatening, in order for their sense of threat to be warranted. I will focus on the 
most prima facie threatening forms of scientism — the strong scientisms — since, given their 
strong formulations, it would not be surprising if they turned out to be most threatening in the 
ways I have outlined. I will not aim to defeat the assumptions here but rather to make them 
explicit and to emphasize their frequent strength and contentiousness. 
3.1 Strong Epistemological Scientism 
 First, take the strong epistemological view that science is the only source of certain 
epistemic goods like knowledge. What are the implications of this particular scientism for 
 On the relation of scientism to physicalism, see Ney (2018); on the relation of scientism to 5
philosophical naturalism, see Stenmark (2018); on the relation of scientism to realism, see 
Nickles (2017). On the confusion of scientism with interdisciplinarity, see Bishop (2019 [and 
possibly this volume]).
 The variety of substantially different conceptions leading to confusion and cross-purposes 6
suggests that ‘scientism’ is conceptually fragmented in a manner described by Taylor and 
Vickers (2017). They argue for the elimination of fragmented concepts; however, I tend to think 
‘scientism’ can be used innocuously so long as we remain diligently conscientious. 
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philosophers? It might be thought to imply that science can get, let’s say, knowledge while 
philosophy can’t.  But this is only implied if one takes the following assumption for granted: 7
(1) Demarcation: Philosophy isn’t science. 
It might initially appear that this assumption is entailed by scientism, but it need not be. 
Proponents of scientism can recognize a continuum in which philosophy and science aren’t 
cleanly demarcated, but bleed into one another, and yet think that the philosophical side of the 
continuum stretches too far from the scientific side. On such a view, it just isn’t true that science 
and not philosophy can get knowledge. Now, it is trivially true from an institutional perspective 
that philosophy isn’t science — philosophers have their own departments, and scientists have 
theirs. However, it is not as obviously true from a philosophical standpoint. That’s because we 
lack adequate, uncontroversial definitions of science and philosophy in virtue of which we can 
definitively distinguish them. The demarcation problem in the philosophy of science is famously 
intractable. Moreover, we lack a good answer to parallel questions about the distinctive nature of 
philosophy and the delineation of its borders. So Demarcation lacks an adequate philosophical 
foundation.  
 You might reasonably suggest that even if we cannot resolve these demarcation issues by 
supplying necessary and sufficient conditions, it is common sense that philosophy differs from 
science in certain important and identifiable respects, some of which are undoubtedly relevant to 
knowledge. After all, many scientists spend their time using highly sophisticated and expensive 
equipment to test predictions that have (given certain auxiliary hypotheses) specific observable 
consequences, while philosophers… don’t. So, you might think that in order to derive the 
conclusion that philosophy can’t get knowledge from the claim that only science can, you need 
not solve the demarcation problem by identifying all the essential differences between 
 While I formulate the assumption in general terms, knowledge will be my running example of 7
science’s allegedly proprietary epistemic good. However, we could equally well substitute 
another epistemic good, or more than one, in its place. 
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philosophy and science; you need only assume that science and philosophy differ in 
epistemically relevant ways. 
(2) Epistemic Distinctness: Science and philosophy are distinct in ways relevant 
to the acquisition of the epistemic goods on which science has a monopoly. 
For example, you might say that science and philosophy differ qua sources of knowledge. 
Philosophy must lack certain qualities that science possesses, in virtue of which science is 
knowledge-conducive, or else philosophy must possess certain knowledge-compromising 
qualities that science lacks. The epistemology of science and the epistemology of philosophy 
must diverge in some epistemically difference-making respect or respects, which the defender of 
strong epistemological scientism must identify.    
 Suppose we were to grant that ‘only science gets knowledge’ implies that philosophy 
doesn’t. Strong epistemological scientism would still not obviously threaten philosophers’ 
statuses, the value of their teaching and research, or their livelihoods. On the one hand, we would 
have to grant that philosophers’ attempted contributions to knowledge universally fail. On the 
other hand, that would not mean that it is impossible for philosophy to produce other epistemic 
goods. For instance, if the particular scientism at issue says that science is the only source of 
knowledge, it leaves open the possibility that philosophy might be a source of epistemic goods 
such as justified belief, evidence, understanding, and so forth. In order for it to follow that 
philosophy is epistemically worthless, we would have to assume: 
(3) Epistemic Value Monism: The epistemic goods on which science has a 
monopoly are the only genuine epistemic goods. 
This precludes justified belief, evidence, understanding, or other putative epistemic goods from 
counting as bonafide epistemic goods, i.e. as epistemically valuable in their own right. Moreover, 
in order for strong epistemological scientism to undermine philosophers’ statuses, the value of 
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their teaching and research, or their place in the university, we would have to assume something 
like: 
(4) Professional Value (Restrictive): For philosophers to be considered serious 
academics, for their teaching and research to be valuable, or for them to have a 
proper place as faculty members in universities requires that they promote those 
epistemic goods on which science has a monopoly.  
In other words, promoting other sorts of good is insufficient for philosophers and their work to 
be valuable and respected. But if promoting other goods is insufficient to make philosophy 
valuable, that must mean that no other goods are valuable in and of themselves. If so, then 
Professional Value (Restrictive) entails that the epistemic goods on which science has a 
monopoly are the only goods simpliciter worth recognizing, preserving, or promoting in 
academic contexts. To accept this, we would have to deny that aesthetic or pragmatic goods are 
genuinely valuable in academic contexts — or valuable enough to be worth pursuing for their 
own sakes. So strong epistemological scientism threatens philosophers’ statuses, work, and 
livelihoods only holding fixed an extremely restrictive view regarding value in academic 
contexts.  
 What about the implications of strong epistemological scientism for philosophers’ 
preferred research methods? Well, if science sometimes gets knowledge and philosophy never 
does, then whatever methods science employs are sometimes knowledge-conducive, and 
whatever methods philosophy employs aren’t ever. For this story to be plausible, we have to 
assume: 
(5) Methodological Distinctness: We can distinguish distinctively ‘scientific’ from 
distinctively ‘philosophical’ methods.  8
 While this assumption is similar to Demarcation, which declared philosophy and science to be 8
distinct, it is more specific. It is consistent with Demarcation that philosophy and science are 
distinct in virtue of something other than their methods (such as their subject matters). 
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In other words, beyond saying that a method happens to be implemented in philosophical or 
scientific practice, we can point to certain methods and say those are squarely scientific methods, 
and we can point to other methods and say those are squarely philosophical methods. The 
question is how — and on what basis — to decide which methods are which. A historical who-
used-it-first approach to the question would risk giving a historically contingent answer to a 
deeper philosophical question (not to mention that philosophy would have an unfair advantage, 
since it predates the advent of modern science). 
 How else might we distinguish distinctively philosophical from distinctively scientific 
methods? Sometimes the tendency is to believe that philosophical method is essentially a priori 
(a belief that Mizrahi 2019, for example, attributes to many philosophers), while scientific 
method is essentially a posteriori. There is a morsel of truth here, since, as I said above, 
scientists often do test hypotheses empirically, while philosophers often don’t (and often can’t). 
However, we must also take care not to rely on imprecise or simplistic caricatures. The 
ambiguity of the term ‘a priori’ (see Field 2005) and, correspondingly, of the term ‘a posteriori’ 
complicates matters. If a method’s apriority requires that it not involve experience in any respect, 
then arguably even ‘traditional’ philosophical reflection fails to be a priori. That is because it is 
often beholden to explanatory demands that invoke judgments of plausibility, unifying power, 
and likelihood relative to a background of experientially based beliefs (Bryant 2020). Moreover, 
Kidd points out that “philosophy is very methodologically pluralistic and has welcomed and, 
indeed, often introduced empirical methods” (2019, 53 [and possibly this volume]). It isn’t clear 
why we should think that, in so doing, philosophical practice has diverged from essentially 
philosophical method. So it is not obvious that philosophical method must be or always is a 
priori.  
 At the same time, as Chakravartty (2013) points out, science isn’t purely a posteriori, 
either. He explains, “not all sciences actually make novel predictions (evolutionary biology), or 
employ experiments (string theory), or are successful in manipulating things 
(cosmology)” (2013, 34). To state the point more positively, scientists implement a range of 
methods that might be considered a priori, including thought experiments (Einstein’s train); 
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computability theory, modal logic, and category theory (used in computer science); mathematics 
(ubiquitous in science); and even armchair speculation (string theory).  Given these sorts of 9
considerations, I believe that equivocating between ‘scientific’ and ‘empirical’ is ill-advised. At 
any rate, distinguishing distinctively philosophical and scientific methods by appeal to at least 
some of the characterizations of the a priori-a posteriori distinction is clumsy and misleading. If 
we are to find some plausible basis for distinguishing them, it will have to be a good deal subtler. 
 Supposing that philosophy and science do have their own distinctive methods, in order 
for it to be plausible that scientific method is sometimes knowledge-conducive, while 
philosophical method never is, we would need an account of the differences between them that 
explain their differential success. One possibility is that scientific method has distinctive 
components that are necessary for knowledge, which philosophical method lacks. To capture this 
thought, we would need the following assumptions: 
(6) Scientific Indispensability: No combination of distinctively philosophical 
methods is sufficient to produce the epistemic goods on which science has a 
monopoly; producing them requires using some distinctively scientific methods. 
(7) Philosophical Failure: Philosophers either never use or never successfully use 
the distinctively scientific methods implicated in the success of science with 
respect to its proprietary epistemic goods. 
In other words, scientists can get knowledge and philosophers can’t because scientists do certain 
distinctively scientific things that philosophers don’t. Scientific Indispensability implies that if 
certain reflective methods, such as the use of thought experiments, count as distinctively 
philosophical, their implementation is insufficient for knowledge even in some scientific 
contexts. For instance, it implies that Einstein’s armchair speculations did not become objects of 
 Of course, it is disputed whether the less empirical pockets of science (such as string theory) 9
count as bonafide science (see Castelvecchi 2015). Moreover, the alleged apriority of 
mathematics and logic is a matter of longstanding controversy (see, for instance, Kitcher 1983). 
So I grant that this is a quick and contentious way of making the point.
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knowledge until they were confirmed empirically. This sort of view is defensible but clearly 
contentious.  
 By contrast, Philosophical Failure is less defensible, since it suggests that the 
philosophers who implement scientific methods (of which there are many) just happen never to 
implement the knowledge-conducive ones, or else always screw up when they do. Since 
philosophers use a wide variety of scientific methods, it would be spectacularly unlucky (not to 
mention incredibly bad news for science) if of none of those methods are knowledge-conducive. 
Moreover, while it’s clear that philosophers sometimes attempt to use scientific methods that 
they haven’t been adequately trained to use and fail (poorly designed statistical surveys come to 
mind), it’s wildly implausible that no philosopher who uses scientific methods ever does so 
correctly. Philosophical Failure also implies that if science and philosophy share certain 
methodological features in common — such as evidential or rational standards, underlying logic 
or inferential patterns, or criteria for theory selection — then, regardless of whether those 
features count as distinctively philosophical or distinctively scientific, insofar as philosophers 
implement them correctly, they can never be independently adequate for knowledge. At any rate, 
a defender of strong epistemological scientism who explains the differential epistemic standing 
of science and philosophy by appeal to Scientific Indispensability and Philosophical Failure will 
have to identify the distinctively scientific ingredients that are necessary for the relevant 
epistemic successes.  
 In addition to it being possible, according to strong epistemological scientism, that 
philosophy fails to produce knowledge because its practice excludes knowledge-conducive 
methods, it is also possible that its epistemic failures are due to its reliance on falsity-conducive 
or justification-undermining methods. If so, then we need the following assumptions: 
(8) Unique Culpability: All methods implicated in the failure of philosophy vis-à-
vis the relevant epistemic goods are distinctively philosophical.  
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(9) No Contamination: When science successfully produces its proprietary 
epistemic goods, its practice includes none of the methods implicated in the 
failure of philosophy vis-à-vis those goods.  
In other words, philosophers always fail to get knowledge while scientists at least sometimes 
don’t because philosophers do certain distinctively philosophical things that scientists at least 
sometimes don’t. For example, if it is the speculative aspects of philosophical method that doom 
philosophy’s epistemic prospects, then epistemically successful science must implement no such 
speculative methods.  Note how much heavy-handed methodological circumscription these 10
assumptions require. At any rate, if the defender of strong epistemological scientism opts for this 
explanation of differential success, then she must identify the failure-conducive features of 
philosophical method.  
 One final question before we can move on from strong epistemological scientism. Does 
the view that science is the only source of epistemic goods like knowledge, if true or if broadly 
believed to be true, threaten the health of the discipline of philosophy? It does only on the 
following assumption: 
(10) Disciplinary Health (Restrictive): The health of the discipline of philosophy 
requires that philosophy produce the epistemic goods on which science has a 
monopoly.  
For example, we would have to assume that the health of the discipline requires that philosophy 
produce knowledge. If we were to allow, contra (3) above, Epistemic Value Monism, that there 
are other genuine epistemic goods, it would not be sufficient for disciplinary health that 
philosophy produce them. Likewise, if we were to allow, contra (4) above, Professional Value 
(Restrictive), that there are non-epistemic goods worth pursuing in academic contexts, it would 
 A defender of this position might have to appeal to something like the distinction between 10
contexts of discovery and of justification in order to handle cases where speculation 
demonstrably lead to discovery and advancement in science (such as well-known Einsteinian 
thought experiments). 
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not be sufficient for disciplinary health that philosophy promote them. On the contrary, 
Disciplinary Health (Restrictive) makes producing the epistemic goods on which science has a 
monopoly a necessary condition of disciplinary health and implies, as such, that failure to 
produce such goods immediately compromises disciplinary health.  
 To sum things up so far, I have been cataloguing the assumptions required to make strong 
epistemological scientism, according to which science is the only source of certain epistemic 
goods such as knowledge, threatening to philosophers. I suggested that the view threatens 
philosophers’ statuses, the value of their teaching and research, as well as their livelihoods only if 
we draw heavy-handed taxonomic and epistemological distinctions between philosophy and 
science, and only if we recognize a narrow range of epistemic and non-epistemic goods worth 
preserving and promoting in academic contexts. Moreover, strong epistemological scientism 
impugns philosophical method only if we assume there are distinctively philosophical research 
methods that differ from scientific ones in identifiable ways, which difference adequately 
explains their differential epistemic success. Finally, the truth of strong epistemological scientism 
implies compromised disciplinary health only if we assume that to be healthy, philosophy must 
produce precisely those epistemic goods that, according to strong epistemological scientism, it 
cannot possibly produce.  
 I have not argued that all of these assumptions are indefensible. Some are undoubtedly 
more defensible than others. Instead, my aim has been to bring to light the background 
assumptions required to make this form of scientism truly threatening to philosophers and to 
emphasize their frequent strength and potential contentiousness, as well as the considerable work 
that would be required to adequately defend them. It should now be clear that strong 
epistemological scientism is not inherently threatening to philosophy or to philosophers; it is 
threatening only if we endorse some combination of the assumptions I have laid out.  
3.2 Strong Methodological Scientism 
 I now turn to strong methodological scientism. Since I’m concerned with the potential 
threat of scientisms to philosophers, I’ll address the formulation that concerns them directly: 
philosophers should only use the methods of science. Note that this thesis requires 
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Methodological Distinctness ((5) above), which posited distinctively scientific methods. Now, 
there’s an immediate question as to the coherence of this thesis, because one might think that 
philosophers would cease to be philosophers if they exclusively used the methods of science.  If 11
so, then the thesis seems to prescribe a contradictory state of affairs: philosophers doing 
something in virtue of which they are not philosophers (or doing nothing in virtue of which they 
are philosophers).  The problem stems from the thought that doing philosophy is essential to 12
being a philosopher. In the interests of examining a prima facie coherent view, let’s not assume 
as much.  13
 Why might one think that philosophers should use only the methods of science? One 
reason might be the belief that only scientific methods can produce desired epistemic goods. In 
other words, strong methodological scientism may naturally rest on strong epistemological 
scientism. Philosophers should use only the methods of science because that’s the only way to 
get knowledge or whichever epistemic goods science has sole access to according to one’s 
preferred version of strong epistemological scientism. If strong methodological scientism comes 
as a package deal with strong epistemological scientism, then the question of whether it is 
plausibly true and plausibly threatening to philosophers should be treated as the question of 
whether the package deal is plausibly true and plausibly threatening to them. Whether we think 
so depends on whether we accept some combination of assumptions (1)-(10) above, plus 
whichever additional ones the methodological thesis invokes.  
 Let’s consider those additional assumptions. If science has a monopoly on certain 
epistemic goods (strong epistemological scientism), and those goods are the only genuine 
epistemic goods (as per (3) Epistemic Value Monism) or the only goods worth pursuing in 
 Note that it’s the strength of the thesis that generates this worry. Weaker formulations don’t 11
face the same problem, since it’s completely coherent to imagine philosophers sometimes using 
non-philosophical methods. 
 Alternatively, the thesis might be interpreted as the claim that philosophers should stop being 12
philosophers and start being scientists, which improves on the previous interpretation with 
respect to coherence but remains remarkably strong.
 However, we will consider a related assumption (Essentiality) below, which, instead of 13
claiming directly that method makes philosophers, will claim that method makes philosophy. 
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academic contexts (as per (4) Professional Value (Restrictive)), and if distinctively scientific 
methods are required for the production of those goods (as per (6) Scientific Indispensability), 
then in order for it to follow that philosophers should use only scientific methods (strong 
methodological scientism), one must additionally assume: 
(11) Restricted Value Promotion: Philosophers should promote only the epistemic 
goods on which science has a monopoly.  
To synthesize the operative assumptions, the idea is that philosophers should exclusively use the 
methods of science because that’s the only way to promote the epistemic goods on which science 
has a monopoly, which philosophers should exclusively promote because those are the only 
goods worth their time.  
 Sometimes methodological scientisms are formulated in terms of ‘empirical methods’ or 
‘the empirical methods of science’. For instance, Mizrahi writes that scientism advocates “the 
use of empirical methods of observation, experimentation, and the like” (2019, 1). An empirical 
formulation of strong methodological scientism states that philosophers should exclusively use 
the empirical methods of science. Proponents of this empirical formulation may require 
additional assumptions, depending on how they view the relation between empirical and 
scientific methods. As we saw above, not all methods employed by science are empirical. If so, 
the thesis that philosophers should exclusively implement empirical methods is more specific 
than the thesis that they should exclusively implement scientific ones. If defenders of the 
empirical formulation acknowledge that the category of scientific methods exceeds the category 
of empirical methods, then their thesis requires the following assumption: 
(12) Unique Credit: Only the empirical methods of science are implicated in the 
success of science vis-à-vis its proprietary epistemic goods. 
We would need an assumption of this kind to justify using only the empirical methods of science. 
Note that Unique Credit is ambiguous between the claim that philosophers should exclusively 
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use all of the empirical methods of science and the claim that they should exclusively use some 
of them. If the claim is that all of its empirical methods should be used, then it must be assumed 
that: 
(13) Total Credit: All of the empirical methods of science are implicated in the 
success of science vis-à-vis its proprietary epistemic goods.  
If the claim is that only some of the empirical methods should be used, then it must be assumed 
that: 
(14) Partial Credit: Only some of the empirical methods of science are implicated 
in the success of science vis-à-vis its proprietary epistemic goods, and we know 
what they are.  
The clause that we know what they are is needed because, on this interpretation, strong 
methodological scientism prescribes the exclusive use of those specific methods.  
 Proponents of the empirical formulation might avoid the need for these additional 
assumptions by denying that the category of scientific method exceeds the category of empirical 
methods. For instance, they might define ‘scientific method’ as essentially empirical, such that 
any non-empirical methods scientists happen to use are by definition not genuinely scientific. 
However, they would have to provide a non-ad-hoc, non-question begging rationale for defining 
scientific method so narrowly.  
 Does strong methodological scientism of the regular or of the empirical variety pose any 
special threat to philosophers, independently of its association with strong epistemological 
scientism? Let’s again consider the statuses of philosophers, the value of their teaching and 
research, and their livelihoods. Strong methodological scientism threatens those things only if: 
(15) Professional Value (Permissive): For philosophers to be considered serious 
academics, for their teaching and research to be valuable, or for them to have a 
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proper place as faculty members in universities requires it to be methodologically 
permissible for them to sometimes use non-scientific/non-empirical methods.  14
Such non-scientific/non-empirical methods could include distinctively philosophical methods. 
On this assumption, for philosophers and their work to be respected and valued, it wouldn’t be 
enough for them to implement scientific/empirical methods to address their own unique 
questions, even if they did so especially inventively or expertly, with interesting or fruitful 
results. Rather, the respectability and value of philosophers and their work hangs on 
philosophers’ entitlement to implement other sorts of method, perhaps including their own 
proprietary methods.   
 As for philosophers’ preferred research methods, strong methodological scientism 
threatens to undermine them only for those philosophers described by the following assumption: 
(16) Non-Naturalism: Some philosophers’ preferred research methods exclude 
scientific/empirical methods. 
This assumption is relatively uncontroversial.  For those it describes, strong methodological 
scientism does — if true — undermine their preferred research methods, since it says they ought 
to use other methods exclusively. The question is roughly what proportion of philosophers fall 
under this category, and how many of them would agree to clumsy circumscriptions of 
philosophical and scientific methods according to which, for instance, armchair speculation is 
inherently un-scientific and empirical research inherently un-philosophical.  
 Finally, strong methodological scientism threatens the health of the discipline only if: 
(17) Disciplinary Health (Permissive): The health of the discipline of philosophy 
requires it to be methodologically permissible for philosophers to sometimes use 
non-scientific/non-empirical methods.  
 As above, the slash indicates possible alternate formulations — I’m not using it to equate 14
‘scientific’ and ‘empirical’, which I have already said is an ill-advised conflation.
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Why think that disciplinary health requires it to be acceptable for philosophers to use non-
scientific/non-empirical methods? One reason might be the belief that philosophical questions 
cannot always be addressed by scientific/empirical methods or cannot always be addressed by 
them alone. In other words: 
(18) Scientific Insufficiency: Scientific/empirical methods are insufficient for the 
purpose of addressing philosophical questions.  
If so, and if philosophers were permitted to use only scientific/empirical methods, they would 
make limited headway on those questions.   15
 An alternate rationale might be that if philosophers were to adhere to a methodology that 
proscribed the use of philosophical methods, philosophy would cease to be philosophy. This is 
related to (but not strictly the same as) the earlier thought that doing philosophy is essential to 
being a philosopher. This related thought is as follows: 
(19) Essentiality: Distinctively philosophical methods are essential to philosophy. 
The idea is that what makes philosophy philosophy is its own distinctive approach to addressing 
its subject matter. According to Essentiality, if we adhered to methodological norms proscribing 
that approach, philosophy would be lost. Such a view isn’t immediately implausible but would 
require spelling out and defending. In particular, it would require the elucidation of philosophy’s 
distinctive methods, as well as a defence of their essentiality.  
 We have seen that since strong methodological scientism is likely motivated by strong 
epistemological scientism, the truth and plausibility of the one requires some of the same 
assumptions as the truth and plausibility of the other. Moreover, the claim that philosophers 
 This raises the vexed issue of whether and to what extent philosophers make progress on 15
philosophical questions, anyway, as well as the question of how to measure such progress. I’ll 
bracket those issue here. 
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should exclusively employ scientific methods requires the assumption that philosophers should 
exclusively promote those goods that are uniquely valuable and that science is uniquely equipped 
to promote. We saw that methodological scientisms can be formulated in terms of scientific 
methods or in terms of empirical methods. Those who prescribe the exclusive use of empirical 
methods while granting that some scientific methods are non-empirical must say whether all and 
only or just some of the empirical methods of science are implicated in the relevant scientific 
successes. We also saw that strong methodological scientism threatens the status and value of 
philosophers and their work, as well as their jobs, only on the assumption that those things 
depend on the methodological permissibility of using non-scientific/non-empirical methods. 
Moreover, strong methodological scientism threatens only the preferred research methods of 
those who accept a clean circumscription of distinctively philosophical methods and distinctively 
scientific/empirical methods, and who prefer the former. Finally, it threatens the health of the 
discipline only on the assumption that philosophy’s disciplinary health requires it to be 
acceptable for philosophers to sometimes use non-scientific/non-empirical methods. Again, some 
of these assumptions are more prima facie plausible than others. The point is that some 
combination of them must be held fixed if strong methodological scientism is to be plausible and 
threatening to philosophers, and that establishing them requires substantial work.  
3.3 Strong Disciplinary Scientism 
 Finally, we have strong disciplinary scientism, according to which science will/should 
subsume/replace all other forms of inquiry. Let’s start with the prospect of replacement, since 
‘replace’ has clearer connotations than ‘subsume’. The prospect of science replacing philosophy 
makes sense only if the two are different things in the first place (as per (1) Demarcation). Once 
we assume so, the prospect of science replacing philosophy is threatening to philosophers — to 
their status, to the value of their teaching and research, or to their jobs — assuming the 
following: 
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(20) Tribulations: The replacement of philosophy by science entails the 
diminishment of philosophers’ individual prestige, the cessation of their teaching 
and research, or the loss of their livelihoods. 
The prospect of philosophy’s ‘replacement’ by science does seem to suggest the replacement of 
philosophers by scientists, an accompanying loss of prestige, and the cessation of their teaching 
and research (at least in institutional settings). Moreover, their teaching and research couldn't 
very well be valuable if it ceased to occur. So strong disciplinary scientism spelled out in terms 
of replacement does seem straightforwardly threatening to philosophers, without especially 
strong assumptions.  
 As for philosophers’ preferred research methods, some of the assumptions I have already 
discussed are required to make strong disciplinary scientism threatening in that regard: there are 
distinctively philosophical methods ((5) Methodological Distinctness), some philosophers prefer 
methods such as those to scientific ones ((16) Non-Naturalism), and the replacement of 
philosophy by science may involve the cessation of philosophical research (Tribulations). The 
replacement form of strong disciplinary scientism threatens philosophers’ preferred research 
methods only on those assumptions. 
 Lastly, replacement formulations of strong disciplinary scientism do clearly threaten 
disciplinary health. That is because the replacement of the discipline of philosophy entails its 
elimination. The discipline cannot very well be healthy if it ceases to be! So, as a thesis about 
replacement, strong disciplinary scientism either normatively or predictively opposes the very 
possibility of disciplinary health. 
 All in all, replacement formulations of strong disciplinary scientism do threaten 
philosophers without much need for strong or contentious assumptions. However, we might 
wonder how many avowedly scientistic thinkers actually endorse such an extreme form of 
scientism. Again, empirical research should support our sociological narratives, but I find it 
unlikely that many — otherwise sensible — people think philosophy should or will be consigned 
to the flames. So while this kind of strong disciplinary scientism poses a theoretical threat to 
philosophers in virtue of its content and some relatively reasonable assumptions, I don’t believe 
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it poses an immediate practical threat to them in virtue of being broadly believed (though 
empirical evidence could prove me wrong).  16
 The subsumption of philosophy by science, on the other hand, does not pose so obvious 
an existential threat. Whether the prospect of subsumption should truly threaten philosophers 
depends on what subsumption entails. The term is meant to suggest the  extension of the 
boundaries of science over philosophy, such that philosophy becomes part of science. This could 
entail changes to the organizational structure of universities: 
(21) Departmental Subsumption: The subsumption of philosophy under science 
entails that philosophy departments become part of faculties of science. 
This would have practical consequences for course listings, program requirements, and so forth, 
but in being merely organizational, it would have no implications for our deeper questions about 
demarcation, epistemology, and methodology. Likewise, unless further conditions are specified 
(pertaining, for instance, to diminished budgets), it has few direct consequences for the 
professional standing of philosophers, the preservation of their methods, or the health of the 
discipline. In and of themselves, such organizational changes would harm philosophers 
professionally only if the following were true: 
(22) Professional Value (Departmental Autonomy): For philosophers to be 
considered serious academics, for their teaching and research to be valuable, or 
for them to have a proper place as faculty members in universities requires that 
departments of philosophy not belong to faculties of science. 
 If so, one might wonder why I have bothered to consider the replacement interpretation at all. 16
As I mentioned at the start of the Section 3, I believe it is instructive to consider how truly 
threatening the most prima facie threatening forms of scientism are.
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It isn’t clear why this would be so. Moreover, since the merely organizational characterization of 
subsumption has no methodological implications, it does not threaten to undermine philosophers’ 
preferred research methods. It harms disciplinary health only on the assumption that: 
(23) Disciplinary Health (Departmental Autonomy): The health of the discipline 
of philosophy requires that departments of philosophy not belong to faculties of 
science.  
Again, it’s not clear why this would be so. So on a merely organizational conception of 
disciplinary subsumption, strong disciplinary scientism is not obviously threatening.  
 Alternate conceptions of subsumption could entail more substantive transformations to 
the way we think about philosophy and to philosophy itself. For example: 
(24) Substantial Subsumption: The subsumption of philosophy under science 
entails that philosophical questions are properly scientific questions, which can/
should be addressed using only scientific methods.  
According to the first clause of this assumption, what some philosophers erstwhile thought to be 
at least partly an independent subject-matter in fact belongs entirely to the domain of scientific 
interest and investigation. Such a view threatens philosophers professionally only if: 
(25) Professional Value (Substantial Autonomy): For philosophers to be 
considered serious academics, for their teaching and research to be valuable, or 
for them to have a proper place as faculty members in universities requires that 
philosophy have a subject-matter at least partly independent of science. 
This assumption would need defending. As for their preferred research methods, the second 
clause of Substantial Subsumption, which I’ll address momentarily, speaks directly to method. 
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Regarding disciplinary health, strong disciplinary scientism, paired with Substantial 
Subsumption, threatens the disciplinary health of philosophy only on the further assumption that: 
(26) Disciplinary Health (Substantial Autonomy): The health of the discipline of 
philosophy requires that it have a subject-matter at least partly independent of 
science.  
This assumption would likewise need defending. So where strong disciplinary scientism 
prescribes or predicts the subsumption of philosophy by science, and where subsumption is taken 
to entail that the subject-matter of philosophy falls entirely under the purview of science, some 
meaty assumptions are required to make the view threatening to philosophers.  
 Different readings of Substantial Subsumption are continuous with different forms of 
strong methodological or epistemological scientism. For instance, the idea that only scientific 
methods can address putatively philosophical questions seems to follow from the thesis that 
science is the only source of evidence about certain sorts of question (one form of strong 
epistemological scientism), together with the assumptions that attribute science’s epistemic 
successes exclusively to its proprietary methods ((5) Methodological Distinctness and (6) 
Scientific Indispensability). The idea that only scientific methods should be used to address our 
questions is equivalent to strong methodological scientism. If the subsumption formulation of 
strong disciplinary scientism invokes strong epistemological or methodological scientism, then 
the assumptions required to make those views plausible and threatening must also be invoked 
here.  
 In sum, as a thesis about the replacement of philosophy by science, strong disciplinary 
scientism threatens philosophers’ professional standing and the health of the discipline of 
philosophy holding fixed relatively modest assumptions. Nevertheless, we may wonder just how 
broadly accepted such extreme forms of scientism are. As a thesis about the subsumption of 
philosophy by science, strong disciplinary scientism is less obviously threatening. If 
subsumption is understood to be merely organizational, then strong disciplinary scientism has 
rather dull teeth. If it is understood to be more substantively transformational, then strong 
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disciplinary scientism threatens philosophers only assuming the importance of a fully 
independent subject-matter, and only if we import some of the assumptions required to make 
strong epistemological or methodological scientism plausibly true and threatening. 
 I wish to pause at this juncture to consider the significance of what has been shown. We 
have seen that, for the most part, strong epistemological, methodological, and disciplinary 
scientisms must be supplemented by strong and often contentious assumptions in order to be 
truly threatening. Just one interpretation — the replacement interpretation of strong disciplinary 
scientism — was plausibly threatening under modest assumptions. This is striking! As I said at 
the beginning of the section, I focused first on the strongest forms of scientism, because if any 
forms are straightforwardly and acutely threatening, one would think it would be them! 
However, I have shown that this is largely not the case. For the most part, not even the 
comparatively extreme forms of scientism are terribly menacing in and of their own accord. I 
believe this is an important upshot. It would be far less surprising to find that more moderate 
forms of scientism aren’t all that intrinsically menacing; after all, they’re moderate! However, 
for the sake of completeness, it’s still worth considering them — a task I turn to now.   
4. Weak Scientism 
 I will take Mizrahi’s weak scientism as a representative example of a more moderate form 
of scientism. According to weak scientism, “Of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge 
is the best knowledge” (2017, 354). Scientific knowledge is best, he claims, in terms of research 
output and impact, as well as with respect to its explanatory, instrumental, and predictive 
successes (2017, 356-357). By the lights of the characterizations of scientism I outlined in 
Section 2, this ‘weak’ scientism would count as a moderate form of epistemological scientism. 
However, I’ll follow Mizrahi and others by calling it ‘weak scientism’. Mizrahi intends weak 
scientism not to be inherently vicious (2017, 352); what sorts of assumptions would make it 
threatening to philosophers? As a weaker form of scientism, it shouldn’t be surprising that 
making it plausibly true and plausibly threatening to philosophers will require assumptions that 
are, in some cases, even stronger than the ones we’ve seen so far.  
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 Weak scientism may be thought to have negative implications for the epistemic status of 
philosophy. For instance, if scientific knowledge is the best form of knowledge, then we might 
think philosophical knowledge is a lesser form. This follows only if we assume: 
(27) Distinctive Knowledge: We can distinguish distinctively ‘scientific’ from distinctively 
‘philosophical’ knowledge. 
We might make the distinction by claiming that scientific knowledge is found in the journal 
articles, textbooks, manuscripts, volumes, and other venues of research dissemination that are 
classified as scientific, while philosophical knowledge is found in the ones classified as 
philosophical. This seems to be Mizrahi’s preferred way of making the distinction when he 
considers things like impact factors. But it should go without saying that this way of making the 
distinction is conventional, historically contingent, and not necessarily philosophically well-
founded.  
 Alternatively, we could say that scientific knowledge results from distinctively scientific 
methods, while philosophical knowledge results from distinctively philosophical methods. To do 
so, we would have to import (5) Methodological Distinctness, which distinguished the two forms 
of method. In that case, defending Distinctive Knowledge would require defending 
Methodological Distinctness.  
 Supposing we can cleanly distinguish scientific from philosophical knowledge, in order 
to conclude that philosophical knowledge is a lesser form of knowledge, we would also have to 
assume: 
(28) Exclusive Best-Making: Scientific knowledge has features that philosophical 
knowledge lacks, in virtue of which it is best.  
Mizrahi defends this sort of assumption when he points to the comparative differences between 
research output and impact in the sciences versus the arts and humanities (2017, 356-357), as 
well as differences in explanatory, instrumental, and predictive success between science and 
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philosophy (2017, 358-362). The point is that defenders of weak scientism need to spell out and 
defend the appropriateness of certain measures by which we can judge knowledge better or 
worse, and to show that science outperforms philosophy relative to those measures.  
 For weak scientism to undermine philosophers’ prestige, the value of their teaching and 
research, or their livelihoods, we would have to assume the following: 
(29) Professional Value (No Inferiority): For philosophers to be considered 
serious academics, for their teaching and research to be valuable, or for them to 
have a proper place as faculty members in universities requires that philosophical 
knowledge not be a lesser form of knowledge. 
But this isn’t reasonable. Philosophers might be considered serious academics, their teaching and 
research might be valuable, and they might have a proper place as faculty members in 
universities even if philosophical knowledge were a lesser form of knowledge. That’s because 
philosophical knowledge might still be valuable — even exceptionally valuable — even if it 
weren’t the best form of knowledge. Moreover, philosophers might promote goods other than 
knowledge, both epistemic and non-epistemic. This shows that in order to truly undermine the 
status and value of philosophers and their work, something like (3) Epistemic Value Monism and 
(4) Professional Value (Restrictive) — which together ruled out the possibility of philosophy 
achieving anything worthwhile — would be needed. More specifically, we would have to 
assume: 
(30) Epistemic Value Monism+: Scientific knowledge is the only genuine 
epistemic good. 
(31) Professional Value (Restrictive)+: For philosophers to be considered serious 
academics, for their teaching and research to be valuable, or for them to have a 
proper place as faculty members in universities requires that they promote 
scientific knowledge. 
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These assumptions entail that promoting putative goods other than scientific knowledge is 
insufficient for philosophers and their work to be respected and valuable. They imply that in 
academic contexts, scientific knowledge is the only good simpliciter worth recognizing, 
promoting, and preserving. This is an exceptionally narrow view of what makes our academic 
activities valuable or worthwhile.  
 As for preferred research methods, it might be thought that the claim ‘scientific 
knowledge is best’ negates the value of philosophical method. However, it does so only if all we 
care about is producing scientific knowledge ((3) Epistemic Value Monism), if there are 
distinctively scientific and distinctively philosophical methods ((5) Methodological 
Distinctness), and if only the scientific methods can get you scientific knowledge ((6) Scientific 
Indispensability). For it to follow that we should stop using philosophical methods altogether, 
we’d have to add: 
(32) Restricted Permissibility: A method should be used only if it conduces to 
scientific knowledge. 
The reason for thinking this might be that we want our method to promote valued goods, and 
scientific knowledge is the only valuable epistemic good or the only good simpliciter worth 
recognizing, preserving, or promoting in academic contexts (i.e. Epistemic Value Monism+ and 
Professional Value (Restrictive)+). Overall, a substantial package of assumptions is required for 
weak scientism to threaten the value and continued advisability of using philosophical methods.  
 Finally, regarding the health of the discipline of philosophy, weak scientism threatens it 
only on the following assumption: 
(33) Disciplinary Health (No Supremacy): The health of the discipline of 
philosophy requires that scientific knowledge not be the best form of knowledge.  
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A natural corollary might add that philosophy should be the best form. Yet it is not clear why this 
would be so, when in principle weak scientism allows that philosophical knowledge might still 
be a good — even exceptionally good — form of knowledge. Even if philosophical knowledge 
were an especially poor form of knowledge according to the metrics we use to gauge such things 
(as is apparently the case in Mizrahi 2017), it wouldn’t obviously condemn the health of the 
discipline. That’s because there would still be a question as to why we should privilege those 
particular metrics and not others. Moreover, it would still be possible for philosophy to promote 
other epistemic and non-epistemic goods that our assessment of disciplinary health should 
consider. 
 To sum up, like the strong forms of scientism, Mizrahi’s more moderate ‘weak scientism’ 
poses an unintended threat to philosophers only holding fixed a number of meaty assumptions. 
Those assumptions must circumscribe philosophical and scientific knowledge and distinguish 
them in respects relevant to the bestness of the knowledge. Moreover, they must declare the 
production of scientific knowledge to be the only valuable academic end and the sole 
determinant of the worth of philosophers, their work, their methods, as well as the health of their 
discipline. This is certainly an extreme view, and if it has any defenders, they have their work cut 
out for them.  
5. Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I set out to consider the sorts of assumptions required to make various 
scientisms threatening to philosophers, in the sense of potentially harming, disrupting, or 
undermining their prestige, the value of their teaching and research, their jobs, their preferred 
research methods, and the health of their discipline. In particular, I examined the assumptions 
required to make strong epistemological, methodological, and disciplinary scientism, as well as 
Mizrahi’s weak scientism threatening in those respects. I found that most of the scientisms 
considered are neither straightforwardly nor inherently threatening to philosophers. Rather, most 
of them — including, tellingly, almost all of the strong scientisms — require the supplementation 
of substantive assumptions in order to be plausibly true and plausibly threatening to 
philosophers. The replacement form of strong disciplinary scientism was atypical in requiring the 
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addition of relatively modest and uncontentious assumptions. In general, the assumptions 
surveyed heavy-handedly circumscribe philosophy and science, their epistemic credentials and 
achievements, their methods, and their subject matters. They also severely restrict the epistemic 
and non-epistemic goods considered valuable, worth promoting, and relevant to disciplinary 
health. While I have scarcely begun to fully address each assumption or its merit, I have revealed 
the numerous and substantive assumptions required for the discussed scientisms to be genuine 
spectres. My hope for the future of the dialectic is that, in addition to consistently and carefully 
disambiguating ‘scientism’, we exhibit greater awareness of and attention to the epistemological, 
methodological, and value-theoretic assumptions on which rest our attitudes toward particular 
forms of scientism. 
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